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24.04. Micro Theory Seminar: Hao Li

Micro Theory Seminar with Hao Li (Vancouver School of Economics)

Event details
  • Micro Theory Seminar
When Apr 24, 2019
from 16:30 to 17:45
Where Faculty Room
Contact Name Stephan Lauermann
Contact Email
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 Unobserved Mechanisms (joint paper with Michael Peters)


 Using a well known environment where buyers have identically and independently distributed private values for an object, we model mechanism design without full observability as a game of imperfect information in which some buyers may not be informed of the commitments made by the seller of the object.  Informed buyers can pretend to be uninformed but uninformed cannot pretend to be informed. In equilibrium, the seller holds an auction among informed buyers with a reserve price that depends on how many informed buyers there are. This reserve price is kept secret from informed buyers when they report their values. 



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