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You are here: Home 27.11. Micro Theory Seminar: Eduardo Perez

27.11. Micro Theory Seminar: Eduardo Perez

Micro Theory Seminar with Eduardo Perez (Sciences Po)

Event details
  • Micro Theory Seminar
When Nov 27, 2019
from 16:30 to 17:45
Where Faculty Room
Contact Name Frances Dilme
Contact Email
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„Information Design with Agency

 We consider a general information design problem in which the task of producing information is delegated to an agent who can privately choose between the procedure designed by the principal and a default procedure. Procedures are constrained as to which messages they use, and possibly how they may be used. The principal can incentivize the agent via transfers conditioned on messages. This gives rise to a moral hazard problem in which the principal faces a trade-off between generating information that is persuasive in the continuation game, or generating information about the choice of the agent so as to lower the cost of agency. We provide a general methodology to solve such problems, and characterize an optimal procedure. We apply our results to information acquisition and persuasion examples. 

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