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02.05. Micro Theory Seminar: Benny Moldovanu

Micro Theory Seminar with Benny Moldovanu (Bonn University)

Event details
  • Micro Theory Seminar
When May 02, 2018
from 16:30 to 17:45
Where faculty room
Contact Name Stephan Lauermann
Contact Email
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A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations



We study the revenue maximizing allocation of m units among n symmetric agents that have unit demand and convex preferences over the probability of receiving an object. Such preferences are naturally induced by a game where the agents take costly actions that affect their values before participating in the mechanism. Both the uniform m + 1 price auction and the discriminatory pay-your-bid auction with reserve prices constitute symmetric revenue maximizing mechanisms. Contrasting the case with linear preferences, the optimal reserve price reacts to both demand and supply, i.e., it depends both on the number of objects m and on number of agents n. The main tool in our analysis is an integral inequality involving majorization, super-modularity and convexity due to Fan and Lorentz (1954).

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