02.05. Micro Theory Seminar: Benny Moldovanu
Micro Theory Seminar with Benny Moldovanu (Bonn University)
Event details  

What 

When 
May 02, 2018 from 16:30 to 17:45 
Where  faculty room 
Contact Name  Stephan Lauermann 
Contact Email  s.lauermann@unibonn.de 
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Topic
A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations
Abstract
We study the revenue maximizing allocation of m units among n symmetric agents that have unit demand and convex preferences over the probability of receiving an object. Such preferences are naturally induced by a game where the agents take costly actions that affect their values before participating in the mechanism. Both the uniform m + 1 price auction and the discriminatory payyourbid auction with reserve prices constitute symmetric revenue maximizing mechanisms. Contrasting the case with linear preferences, the optimal reserve price reacts to both demand and supply, i.e., it depends both on the number of objects m and on number of agents n. The main tool in our analysis is an integral inequality involving majorization, supermodularity and convexity due to Fan and Lorentz (1954).
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Micro Theory Seminar