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03.05. Micro Theory Seminar: Leeat Yariv

Micro Theory Seminar with Leeat Yariv (California Institute of Technology)

Event details
  • Micro Theory Seminar
When May 03, 2017
from 16:30 to 17:45
Where Faculty Room
Contact Name Stephan Lauermann
Contact Email
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On the Efficiency of Stable Matchings in Large Markets 



 Stability is often the goal for matching clearinghouses, such as those matching residents to hospitals, students to schools, etc. We study the wedge between stability and utilitarian efficiency in large one-to-one matching markets. We show stable matchings are efficient asymptotically for a rich preference class. The speed at which efficiency of stable matchings converges to its optimum depends on the underlying preferences. Furthermore, for severely imbalanced markets governed by idiosyncratic preferences, or when preferences are sub-modular, stable outcomes may be inefficient asymptotically. Our results can guide market designers who care about efficiency as to when standard stable mechanisms are desirable.


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