04.12. Micro Theory Seminar: Sophie Bade

Cooperative mechanism design uses cooperative instead of non-cooperative game forms to implement social choice functions. In line with standard implementation theory, a game form implements a social choice function, if the outcome of the social choice function at any given prole of preferences equals the solution of the game in-

duced by the game form and the given prole of preferences. While different solution concepts for cooperative games yield different concepts of implementation, I focus on core implementation. Since core-implementable social choice functions are strategyproof and Pareto optimal, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem applies. I therefore study core-implementability in four domains that are not

aicted by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite result: social choice with single peaked preferences, house matching, house matching with single peaked preferences and division with single peaked preferences.