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04.12. Micro Theory Seminar: Sophie Bade

Micro Theory Seminar with Sophie Bade (University of London)

Event details
  • Micro Theory Seminar
When Dec 04, 2019
from 16:30 to 17:45
Where Faculty Room
Contact Name Francesc Dilmé
Contact Email
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Cooperative Implementation

Cooperative mechanism design uses cooperative instead of non-cooperative game forms to implement social choice functions. In line with standard implementation theory, a game form implements a social choice function, if the outcome of the social choice function at any given prole of preferences equals the solution of the game in-
duced by the game form and the given prole of preferences. While different solution concepts for cooperative games yield different concepts of implementation, I focus on core implementation. Since core-implementable social choice functions are strategyproof and Pareto optimal, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem applies. I therefore study core-implementability in four domains that are not
aicted by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite result: social choice with single peaked preferences, house matching, house matching with single peaked preferences and division with single peaked preferences.

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