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You are here: Home Seminars 09.11. Micro Theory Seminar: Sergei Severinov

09.11. Micro Theory Seminar: Sergei Severinov

Micro Theory Seminar with Sergei Severinov (University of British Columbia)

Event details
What
  • Micro Theory Seminar
When Nov 09, 2017
from 12:00 to 13:20
Where faculty room
Contact Name Stephan Lauermann
Contact Email
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Topic

Optimal and Efficient Mechanisms with Budget Constrained Buyers

 

Abstract

The paper characterizes both the optimal (revenue-maximizing) and constrained-efficient (surplus maximizing) mechanisms for allocating a good to buyers who face budget constraints. With unequal budgets, this problem is that of asymmetric optimal mechanism design.
Both the optimal and efficient mechanisms belong to one of two classes. When the budget differences are small, the
mechanism discriminates only between high-valuation types for whom the budget constraint is binding.
All low valuations buyers are treated symmetrically despite budget differences.
When budget differences are sufficiently large, the mechanism
discriminates in favor of buyers with small budgets when the valuations are low, and in favor of buyers with larger budgets when the valuations are high.

 


Paper: Download

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