13.12. Micro Theory Seminar: Vijay Krishna
Micro Theory Seminar with Vijay Krishna
Event details  

What 

When 
Dec 13, 2017 from 16:30 to 17:45 
Where  faculty room 
Contact Name  Stephan Lauermann 
Contact Email  s.lauermann@unibonn.de 
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Topic
Communication and Cooperation in Repeated Games (joint with Yu Awaya)
Abstract
We study the role of communication in repeated games with private monitoring. We first show that without communication, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in such games is a subset of the set of epsiloncoarse correlated equilibrium payoffs (epsilonCCE) of the underlying oneshot game. The value of "epsilon" depends on the discount factor and the quality of monitoring. We then identify conditions under which there are equilibria with "cheap talk" that result in nearly efficient payoffs outside the set epsilonCCE. Thus, in our model, communication is necessary for cooperation.
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Micro Theory Seminar