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13.12. Micro Theory Seminar: Vijay Krishna

Micro Theory Seminar with Vijay Krishna

Event details
  • Micro Theory Seminar
When Dec 13, 2017
from 16:30 to 17:45
Where faculty room
Contact Name Stephan Lauermann
Contact Email
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Communication and Cooperation in Repeated Games (joint with Yu Awaya)



We study the role of communication in repeated games with private monitoring. We first show that without communication, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in such games is a subset of the set of epsilon-coarse correlated equilibrium payoffs (epsilon-CCE) of the underlying one-shot game. The value of "epsilon" depends on the discount factor and the quality of monitoring. We then identify conditions under which there are equilibria with "cheap talk" that result in nearly efficient payoffs outside the set epsilon-CCE. Thus, in our model, communication is necessary for cooperation.

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