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18.04. Micro Theory Seminar: Françoise Forges

Micro Theory Seminar with Françoise Forges (Paris Dauphine University)

Event details
  • Micro Theory Seminar
When Apr 18, 2018
from 17:15 to 18:30
Where faculty room
Contact Name Stephan Lauermann
Contact Email
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Please note the different timing. The Seminar will take place from 5:15 to 6:30 pm.


Strategic information transmission with sender's approval




-       We consider a sender-receiver game in which the sender has a finite set of types, the receiver makes a decision in a compact convex set X and the (typically type-dependent) utility functions are continuous. We assume that, after the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject in favor of an outside option, and that the sender's approval is crucial to the receiver. We ask whether the game has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE).

-   We construct a counter-example (with three types for the sender and type-dependent affine utility functions) in which there is no PBE, but there is a communication equilibrium.

-    We show that a PBE exists if either (i) the sender only has two types or (ii) the decision set X is a real interval and the sender’s utility function is monotonic, whatever his type or (iii) the receiver’s utility function does not depend on the sender’s type.

-  We show that a communication equilibrium always exists when the sender has three types and the utility functions are affine.

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