18.04. Micro Theory Seminar: Françoise Forges
Micro Theory Seminar with Françoise Forges (Paris Dauphine University)
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When 
Apr 18, 2018 from 17:15 to 18:30 
Where  faculty room 
Contact Name  Stephan Lauermann 
Contact Email  [Email protection active, please enable JavaScript.] 
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Please note the different timing. The Seminar will take place from 5:15 to 6:30 pm.
Topic
Strategic information transmission with sender's approval
Abstract
 We consider a senderreceiver game in which the sender has a finite set of types, the receiver makes a decision in a compact convex set X and the (typically typedependent) utility functions are continuous. We assume that, after the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject in favor of an outside option, and that the sender's approval is crucial to the receiver. We ask whether the game has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE).
 We construct a counterexample (with three types for the sender and typedependent affine utility functions) in which there is no PBE, but there is a communication equilibrium.
 We show that a PBE exists if either (i) the sender only has two types or (ii) the decision set X is a real interval and the sender’s utility function is monotonic, whatever his type or (iii) the receiver’s utility function does not depend on the sender’s type.
 We show that a communication equilibrium always exists when the sender has three types and the utility functions are affine.