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20.06. Micro Theory Seminar: Xianwen Shi

Micro Theory Seminar with Xianwen Shi (Toronto University)

Event details
  • Micro Theory Seminar
When Jun 20, 2018
from 16:30 to 17:45
Where faculty room
Contact Name Stephan Lauermann
Contact Email
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Optimal Discriminatory Disclosure




A seller of an indivisible good designs a selling mechanism for a buyer who knows the distribution of his valuation for the good but not the realization of his valuation. The seller can choose how much additional private information about his valuation that the buyer may access. Under the assumption that the buyer's valuation distributions are ranked by likelihood ratio dominance, we show that the seller's optimal disclosure policy has an interval structure. Moreover, information discrimination has to interact with price discrimination to be effective. When price discrimination is infeasible, non-discriminatory disclosure can attain the maximal revenue achievable under discriminatory disclosure. When price discrimination is feasible, however, the optimal disclosure policy is generally discriminatory, that is, the seller provides differential access to information for different buyer types.

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