One Two
« July 2020 »
Mo Tu We Th Fr Sa Su
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20 21 22 23 24 25 26
27 28 29 30 31
You are here: Home Seminars 20.11. Micro Theory Seminar: Daniel Garrett

20.11. Micro Theory Seminar: Daniel Garrett

Micro Theory Seminar with Daniel Garrett (Toulouse School of Economics)

Event details
  • Micro Theory Seminar
When Nov 20, 2019
from 16:30 to 17:45
Where Faculty Room
Contact Name Frances Dilmé
Contact Email
Add event to calendar vCal


 Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting


 Financial incentives can induce effort and so enhance the surplus generated by agency relationships. An important question is often: who benefits from such incentives, especially how will​ the surplus from incentive contracting be divided between principal and agent? Answering this​ question is challenging in settings where information is scarce. This paper is aimed at answering the question in a canonical agency model from the perspective of an analyst who does not know​ the agent's preferences for responding to incentives, but does know that the principal knows them​ and will contract optimally. The paper provides tight bounds on the principal's expected benefit from optimal incentive contracting across feasible values of the agent's expected rents.


Paper: Download

filed under:
Document Actions