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24.10. Micro Theory Seminar: Qingmin Liu

Micro Theory Seminar with Qingmin Liu (Columbia University)

Event details
  • Micro Theory Seminar
When Oct 24, 2018
from 16:30 to 17:45
Where faculty room
Contact Name Stephan Lauermann
Contact Email
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 Rational Expectations, Stable Beliefs, and Stable Matching


 We propose a new criterion for stability of two-sided matching markets with asymmetric
information. The criterion requires the Bayesian consistency of three probabilistic beliefs: exogenously given prior beliefs, off-path beliefs conditional on counterfactual pairwise blockings, and on-path beliefs for stable matchings in the absence of such blockings. The formulation provides a language for assessing matching outcomes with respect to their supporting beliefs and enables further belief-based refinements. We also define criteria of match efficiency, rational expectations competitive equilibrium, and the core. Their contrast with pairwise stability manifests the role of information asymmetry in matching formation.

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