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25.10. Micro Theory Seminar: Shengwu Li

Micro Theory Seminar with Shengwu Li (Harvard Society of Fellows)

Event details
  • Micro Theory Seminar
When Oct 25, 2017
from 16:30 to 17:45
Where faculty room
Contact Name Stephan Lauermann
Contact Email
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Credible Mechanism Design



Consider an extensive-form mechanism, run by an auctioneer who communicates sequentially and privately with agents. Suppose the auctioneer can make any deviation that no single agent can detect. We study the mechanisms such that it is incentive-compatible for the auctioneer not to deviate -- the credible mechanisms. Consider the ex post individually-rational optimal auctions. The first-price auction is the unique sealed-bid credible mechanism. The ascending auction is the unique strategy-proof credible mechanism.

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