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News


We welcome three new postdocs to Bonn:


 
 
  
 
 

Mirjam Salish received Graduate Student Award


Mirjam_pic
 

Mirjam Salish received the 2015 Graduate Student Award at the UECE Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications for her paper "Learning faster or more precisely? Strategic experimentation in networks".

The Award is given to the Ph.D. student who presented the best paper during the yearly "UECE Lisbon conference".

 

FEEM Award 2015

 

Anne-Katrin Roesler has been awarded the 2015 FEEM Award, a prize that is given to the authors of the three best papers presented by young economists at the annual congress of the EEA. The selection committee sees her paper Is Ignorance Bliss? Rational Inattention and Optimal Pricing as “an impressive and beautiful theory piece, and an important contribution to the nascent literature on rational inattention”.

Anne-Katrin recently graduated from the BGSE and will start as a research associate at Northwestern University before she goes on to an assistant professorship at the University of Michigan in 2016. 

More details: 

http://www.eeassoc.org/index.php?site=&trsz=1

 
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You are here: Home Seminars 26.04. BGSE Micro Workshop: Daniel Bird

26.04. BGSE Micro Workshop: Daniel Bird

BGSE Micro Workshop with Daniel Bird (Tel-Aviv University)

Event details
What
  • BGSE Workshop
When Apr 26, 2017
from 12:00 to 13:00
Where Room 0.017
Contact Name Stephan Lauermann
Contact Email
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Topic

Dynamic Nonmonetary Incentives

 

Abstract

We study a principal-agent interaction where investments and rewards arrive stochastically over time, and are privately observed by the agent. Investments (costly for the agent, benecial for the principal) can be concealed by the agent. Rewards (benecial for the agent, costly for the principal) can be forbidden by the principal. We ask how rewards should be used and which investments incentivized. We identify the unique optimal mechanism and analyze the dynamic investment and compensation policies. When all rewards are identical, the unique optimal way to provide incentives is by a "carte-blanche" to pursue all rewards arriving in a predetermined timeframe.

 

Paper: Download

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