Mirjam Salish received the 2015 Graduate Student Award at the UECE Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications for her paper "Learning faster or more precisely? Strategic experimentation in networks".
The Award is given to the Ph.D. student who presented the best paper during the yearly "UECE Lisbon conference".
Anne-Katrin Roesler has been awarded the 2015 FEEM Award, a prize that is given to the authors of the three best papers presented by young economists at the annual congress of the EEA. The selection committee sees her paper Is Ignorance Bliss? Rational Inattention and Optimal Pricing as “an impressive and beautiful theory piece, and an important contribution to the nascent literature on rational inattention”.
Anne-Katrin recently graduated from the BGSE and will start as a research associate at Northwestern University before she goes on to an assistant professorship at the University of Michigan in 2016.
Micro Theory Seminar with Jennifer Reinganum & Andrew Daughety (Vanderbilt University)
Apr 26, 2017
from 04:40 to 05:45
|Contact Name||Stephan Lauermann|
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We develop a model of individual prosecutors (and teams of prosecutors) and show how, in equilibrium, team-formation can lead to increased incentives to suppress evidence (relative to those faced by a lone prosecutor). Our model assumes that each individual prosecutor is characterized by a variable that captures that individual’s level of tradeoff between a desire for career advancement (by winning a case) and a disutility for unjustly convicting an innocent defendant by suppressing exculpatory evidence. We assume a population of prosecutors that is heterogeneous with respect to this tradeoff rate, and each individual’s tradeoff rate is their own private information. A convicted defendant may later discover the exculpatory information; a judge will then void the conviction and may order an investigation. If the prosecutor is found to have violated the defendant’s Brady rights (to exculpatory evidence), this results in penalizing the prosecutor. The payoff from winning a case is a public good (among the team members) while any penalties are private bads. The anticipated game between the prosecutors and the judge is the main focus of this paper. The decision to investigate a sole prosecutor, or a team of prosecutors, is determined endogenously. We show that the equilibrium assignment of roles within the team involves concentration of authority about suppressing/disclosing evidence.