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27.06. BGSE Micro Workshop: Saskia Fuchs

BGSE Micro Workshop with Saskia Fuchs (University of Bonn)

Event details
  • BGSE Workshop
When Jun 27, 2018
from 13:15 to 14:15
Where room 0.017
Contact Name Stephan Lauermann
Contact Email
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Persuading an Informed Committee


A biased sender tries to persuade a committee to vote for a proposal by providing public information about its quality. Each voter has some private information about the proposal’s quality. We characterize the sender-optimal disclosure policy under unanimity rule when the sender can versus cannot ask voters for a report about their private information. The sender can only profit from asking agents about their private signals when the private information is sufficiently accurate. For all smaller accuracy levels, a sender who cannot elicit the private information is equally well off.
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