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You are here: Home Seminars BGSE Workshop, 24.06.: Justus Preusser

BGSE Workshop, 24.06.: Justus Preusser

BGSE Workshop with Justus Preusser (University of Bonn)

Event details
  • BGSE Workshop
When Jun 24, 2020
from 12:00 to 13:00
Where Zoom
Contact Name Francesc Dilmé
Contact Email
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Title: On Simple Allocation with Correlated Values





A principal must allocate a single indivisible object to one of finitely many agents without the use of monetary transfers. Every agent desires the object and is privately informed about the principal's value of giving it to him. There are no restrictions on the joint distribution of these values.
When there are only two agents, every Bayesian incentive- compatible allocation rule is interim-equivalent to a constant allocation rule. In particular, the principal cannot do better than if she were to ignore all reports. This negative result is overcome in asymmetric environments with three or more agents, where all optimal dominant-strategy incentive-compatible allocation rules may be non-constant. The results shed light on the roles played by asymmetries and the number of agents.
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