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You are here: Home Seminars Past Seminars

Past Seminars

A list of all past guest speakers in our Micro Theory Seminar

Summer Semester 2020

Winter Semester 2019/2020

Summer Semester 2019

Winter Semester 2018/2019

Summer Semester 2018

Winter Semester 2017/2018

Winter Semester 2016/2017

 
 

Summer Semester 2016

 
  • Peter Kondor (Learning in Crowded Markets) 
  • Moritz Mayer-ter-Vehn (A Human Resource Theory of Persistent Productivity Dispersion/ A Controversial War of Attribution)
  • Tobit Gamp (Guided Search)
  • Jidong Zhou (Competitive Bundling)
  • Francesc Dilmé (Residual Deterrence)
  • Daniel Quint (Indicative Bidding in Auctions with Costly Entry)
  • David Levine (Voter Participation with Collusive Parties)
  • Susanne Goldlücke (Assigning an unpleasant job without payment)
  • Ran Spiegler (Can Agents with Causal Misperceptions be Systematically Fooled?)
  • Chang-Koo Chi (Common Value All-pay Auctions)
  • Antonio Cabrales (Targeted Socialization and Production)
  • Olga Gorelkina (Estimate Based Dynamic Implementation)
  • Matthew Elliot (Decentralized Bargaining: Efficiency and the Core/ Commitment and (In)Efficiency: A Bargaining Experiment)
  • Albin Erlanson (Allocating divisible and indivisible resources according to conflicting claims: collectively rational solutions)
  • Benny Moldovanu (Sophisticated Sincerity with Incomplete Information)
  • Deniz Dizdar (Uncertainty and Investment Incentives in Finite Matching Contests)
  • Vikram Manjunath (Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement)
  • Nina Bobkova (Learning to Persuade)
  • Marcus Matthias Opp (Only Time will Tell - A Theory of deferred compensation)


Winter Semester 2015/2016

 
  • Jörgen Weibull (Evolution leads to Kantain morality)
  • Darrell Duffie (Size Discovery)
  • Christian Krestel (Optimal Stopping With Regret)
  • Gilat Levy (Perceptions of Correlation, Communication, and Ambiguity)
  • Felix Bierbrauer (Robust Mechanism Design and Social Preferences)
  • Yeon-Koo Che (Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets)
  • Larbi Alaoui (Cost-Benefit Analysis in Reasoning)
  • Johannes Hörner (Motivational Ratings)
  • Florian Scheuer (The Taxation of Superstars)
  • Brett Green (On Breakthroughs, Deadlines, and the Nature of Progress: Contracting for Multistage Projects)
  • Nick Netzer (Informational Requirements of Nudging)
  • Ilan Kremer (Benefits of Minimum Standards in Voluntary Certification)
  • Philipp Sadowski (Magical Thinking: A Representative Result)
  • Philipp Külpmann (Procrastination and Projects)
  • Matthias Messner (Selling to the mean)
  • Benjamin Bachi (Buridanic Competition)
 

Summer Semester 2015

 
  • Willemien Kets (A belief-based theory of homophily)
  • Jan Eeckhout (Stochastic Sorting)
  • Meg Meyer (Beyond Correlation: Measuring Interdependence Through Complementarities)
  • George Mailath (The Curse of Long Horizons)
  • Paul Heidhues (Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning)
  • Hamid Sabourian (Repeated Implementation with Incomplete Information)
  • Fuhito Kojima (Stability Concepts in Matching Under Distributional Constraints)
  • Alex Wolitzky (Enforcing Cooperation: Community Enforcement vs. Specialized Enforcement)
  • Simon Board (Competitive Information Disclosure and Consumer Search)
  • Qinggong Wu (A Nonstationary Two-sided Matching Game)
  • Claudia Herresthal (School Rankings, Student Allocations and School Choice Reforms)
  • Ariel Rubinstein (Back to Fundamentals: Equilibrium in Abstract Economies)
  • Debasis Mishra (Local Incentive Compatibility with Transfers)
  • Jingfeng Lu (Optimal Contest Design with Incomplete Information)
  • Philipp Kircher (Efficient Competition through Cheap Talk: The Case of Competing Auctions)
  • Dan Barron (Policies in Relational Contracts)
  • Philipp Strack (On the Speed of Social Learning)
  

Winter Semester 2014/2015

 
  • Kristof Madarasz (Projection Equilibrium: Definition and Applications to Bargaining and Social Investment)
  • Simon Loertscher (Multi-Unit Dominant Strategy DoubleAuctions)
  • Rida Laraki (On the Existence of Approximate Equilibria and Sharing Rule Solutions in Discontinuous Games)
  • Michael Mandler (Coarse, Efficient Decision-Making)
  • Emre Ozdenoren (Rank Dependent Contracts)
  • Christoph Kuzmics (Communication before coordination with independent private values: How pedestrians avoid bumping into each other)
  • David Dillenberger (Cautious Expected Utility and the Certainty Effect)
  • Juanjo Ganuza (Procurement and Accidents: Bidding for Judgment Proofness, and the Liability Curse)
  • Julien Prat (Human Capital and Optimal Redistribution)
  • Francis Bloch (Dynamic Allocation of Objects to Queuing Agents: The Discrete Model)
  • Andrea Attar (Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets: Cross-Subsidies and Quantity Discounts)
  • Vitor Farinha Luz (Characterization and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance)
  • Peter Schwardmann

Summer Semester 2014

 
  • Marina Halac (Contests for Experimentation)
  • Johannes Hörner (Optimal Design for Social Learning)
  • Hector Chade (Coverage Denied: Excluding Bad Risks, Inefficiency, and Pooling in Insurance)
  • Tymofiy Mylovanov (Bayesian Persuasion with Heterogeneous Audience)
  • Mehmet Ekmekci (Manipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation)
  • Felix Kübler (Recursive equilibria in dynamic economies with stochastic production)
  • Jakub Steine (Perceiving Prospects Properly)
  • Alessandro Bonatti (Miscoordination and Delay in Strategic Experimentation)
  • Vasiliki Skreta (Selling under Product and Taste Heterogeneity)
 

Winter Semester 2013/2014

 
  • Philippe Jehiel
  • Andriy Zapechelnyuk (Optimality of noncompetitive allocation rules)
  • Alp Atakan (Auctions, actions, and the failure of information aggregation)
  • John Quah (A test for weakly separable preferences)
  • Ilse Lindenlaub (Sorting Multidimensional Types)
  • V. Bhaskar
  • Joel Sobel
  • Botond Köszegi (Seller Information about Consumer Naiveté lowers welfare)
 

Summer Semester 2013

 
  • Ilya Segal (Heuristic Auctions and U.S. Spectrum Reallocation)
  • Ian Jewitt (Adverse Selection with Multidimensional Heterogeneity of Types and Information)
  • Daniel Garrett (Competitive Screening and Search)
  • Jeanne Hagenbach (Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure)
  • Andrei Shleifer (Competition for Attention)
  • Huseyin Yildirim ((Un)Informed Charitable Giving)
  • Nicolas Vieille (Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games)
  • Ian Jewitt (Adverse Selection with Multidimensional Heterogeneity of Types and Information)
  • Kohei Kawamura (Biasing Contests for Selection)
  • Audrey Hu (English Auctions with Ensuing Risks and Heterogeneous Bidders)
  • Stefano dellaVigna (Voting to Tell Others)
 

Job Market Talks

 
  • Mikhail Safronov (University of Cambridge)
  • Tobit Gamp (University College London)
  • Nina Bobkova (University Bonn)
  • Gleb Romanyuk (Harvard University)
  • Mirjam Salish (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
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