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You are here: Home Seminars Past Seminars

Past Seminars

A list of all past guest speakers in our Micro Theory Seminar

Winter Semester 2017/2018

  • Marek Pycia (Invariance and Matching Market Outcomes)
  • Olivier Gossner (An instrumental approach to the value of information)
  • Shengwu Li (Credible Mechanism Design)
  • Roberto Serrano (Level-k Mechanism Design)
  • Sergei Severinov (Optimal and Efficient Mechanisms with Budget Constrained Buyers)
  • Nicolas Klein (University of Montreal)
  • Juuso Välimäki (All-Pay Auctions with Affiliates Values)
  • Syed Nageeb Ali (A Theory of Self-Enforcing Coalitions)
  • Vijay Krishna (Communication and Cooperation in Repeated Games)
  • Wouter Hendrik Dessein (Organizations with Power-Hungry Agents)
  • Ludmila Matyskova (Bayesian Persuasion With Costly Information Acquisition)
  • Laura Doval (Sequential Information Design)
  • Takuro Yamashita (Splitting problem applied to Bayesian persuasion and mechanism design with externalities)


Summer Semester 2017

  • Wolfgang Pesendorfer (Random Evolving Lotteries and Intrinsic Preference for Information)
  • Daniel Bird (Dynamic Nonmonetary Incentives)
  • Jennifer Reinganum & Andrew Daughety (Information Suppression by Teams and Violations of the Brady Rule)
  • Leeat Yariv (On the Efficiency of Stable Matchings in Large Markets)
  • Rakesh Vohra (Stable Matchings and Scarf's Lemma)
  • Jonas von Wangenheim (Buyer-Optimal Signals in Sequential Screening)
  • Rahul Deb (Evaluating Strategic Forecasters)
  • Maarten Janssen (Wholesale Price Discrimination and Recommended Retail Prices)
  • Larry Samuelson (The Implementation Duality)
  • Colin Stewart (Rational Inattention Dynamics)
  • Mohammad Akbarpour (Thickness and Information in Dynamic Matching Markets)
  • Roland Strausz (Mechanism Design with Partially Verifiable Information)
  • Nicola Pavoni (Optimal Delegation, Unawareness, and Financial Intermediation)
  • Tobit Gamp (Deceptive Products and Competition in Search Markets)

Winter Semester 2016/2017

  • Roland Strausz (A Theory of Crowdfunding - a mechanism design approach with demand                 uncertainty and moral hazard)
  • Tymofiy Mylovanov (Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver)
  • Santiago Oliveros (Competing for Loyalty: The Dynamics of Rallying Support)
  • Olivier Tercieux (The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence)
  • Philip J. Reny (Broad Sequential Equilibria of Multi-Stage Games with Infinite Sets of Signals           and Actions)
  • Willemien Kets (Robust Multiplicity with a Grain of Naivete)
  • Gabriol Carroll (Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities)
  • Johannes Schneider (Managing a Conflict)
  • Andrew Rhodes (Multiproduct Intermediaries)
  • Maxwell Stinchcombe (Planning for the Long Run: Programming with Patient, Pareto                         Responsive Preferences)
  • Francesco Nava (Multi-Variety Durable-Goods Monopoly)
  • Ludovic Renou (Revealed Preferences over Risk and Uncertainty)
  • Frédéric Koessler (Selling with Evidence)
  • Guillaume R. Fréchette (Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma)

    Summer Semester 2016

    • Peter Kondor (Learning in Crowded Markets) 
    • Moritz Mayer-ter-Vehn (A Human Resource Theory of Persistent Productivity Dispersion/ A Controversial War of Attribution)
    • Tobit Gamp (Guided Search)
    • Jidong Zhou (Competitive Bundling)
    • Francesc Dilmé (Residual Deterrence)
    • Daniel Quint (Indicative Bidding in Auctions with Costly Entry)
    • David Levine (Voter Participation with Collusive Parties)
    • Susanne Goldlücke (Assigning an unpleasant job without payment)
    • Ran Spiegler (Can Agents with Causal Misperceptions be Systematically Fooled?)
    • Chang-Koo Chi (Common Value All-pay Auctions)
    • Antonio Cabrales (Targeted Socialization and Production)
    • Olga Gorelkina (Estimate Based Dynamic Implementation)
    • Matthew Elliot (Decentralized Bargaining: Efficiency and the Core/ Commitment and (In)Efficiency: A Bargaining Experiment)
    • Albin Erlanson (Allocating divisible and indivisible resources according to conflicting claims: collectively rational solutions)
    • Benny Moldovanu (Sophisticated Sincerity with Incomplete Information)
    • Deniz Dizdar (Uncertainty and Investment Incentives in Finite Matching Contests)
    • Vikram Manjunath (Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement)
    • Nina Bobkova (Learning to Persuade)
    • Marcus Matthias Opp (Only Time will Tell - A Theory of deferred compensation)

    Winter Semester 2015/2016

    • Jörgen Weibull (Evolution leads to Kantain morality)
    • Darrell Duffie (Size Discovery)
    • Christian Krestel (Optimal Stopping With Regret)
    • Gilat Levy (Perceptions of Correlation, Communication, and Ambiguity)
    • Felix Bierbrauer (Robust Mechanism Design and Social Preferences)
    • Yeon-Koo Che (Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets)
    • Larbi Alaoui (Cost-Benefit Analysis in Reasoning)
    • Johannes Hörner (Motivational Ratings)
    • Florian Scheuer (The Taxation of Superstars)
    • Brett Green (On Breakthroughs, Deadlines, and the Nature of Progress: Contracting for Multistage Projects)
    • Nick Netzer (Informational Requirements of Nudging)
    • Ilan Kremer (Benefits of Minimum Standards in Voluntary Certification)
    • Philipp Sadowski (Magical Thinking: A Representative Result)
    • Philipp Külpmann (Procrastination and Projects)
    • Matthias Messner (Selling to the mean)
    • Benjamin Bachi (Buridanic Competition)

    Summer Semester 2015

    • Willemien Kets (A belief-based theory of homophily)
    • Jan Eeckhout (Stochastic Sorting)
    • Meg Meyer (Beyond Correlation: Measuring Interdependence Through Complementarities)
    • George Mailath (The Curse of Long Horizons)
    • Paul Heidhues (Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning)
    • Hamid Sabourian (Repeated Implementation with Incomplete Information)
    • Fuhito Kojima (Stability Concepts in Matching Under Distributional Constraints)
    • Alex Wolitzky (Enforcing Cooperation: Community Enforcement vs. Specialized Enforcement)
    • Simon Board (Competitive Information Disclosure and Consumer Search)
    • Qinggong Wu (A Nonstationary Two-sided Matching Game)
    • Claudia Herresthal (School Rankings, Student Allocations and School Choice Reforms)
    • Ariel Rubinstein (Back to Fundamentals: Equilibrium in Abstract Economies)
    • Debasis Mishra (Local Incentive Compatibility with Transfers)
    • Jingfeng Lu (Optimal Contest Design with Incomplete Information)
    • Philipp Kircher (Efficient Competition through Cheap Talk: The Case of Competing Auctions)
    • Dan Barron (Policies in Relational Contracts)
    • Philipp Strack (On the Speed of Social Learning)

    Winter Semester 2014/2015

    • Kristof Madarasz (Projection Equilibrium: Definition and Applications to Bargaining and Social Investment)
    • Simon Loertscher (Multi-Unit Dominant Strategy DoubleAuctions)
    • Rida Laraki (On the Existence of Approximate Equilibria and Sharing Rule Solutions in Discontinuous Games)
    • Michael Mandler (Coarse, Efficient Decision-Making)
    • Emre Ozdenoren (Rank Dependent Contracts)
    • Christoph Kuzmics (Communication before coordination with independent private values: How pedestrians avoid bumping into each other)
    • David Dillenberger (Cautious Expected Utility and the Certainty Effect)
    • Juanjo Ganuza (Procurement and Accidents: Bidding for Judgment Proofness, and the Liability Curse)
    • Julien Prat (Human Capital and Optimal Redistribution)
    • Francis Bloch (Dynamic Allocation of Objects to Queuing Agents: The Discrete Model)
    • Andrea Attar (Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets: Cross-Subsidies and Quantity Discounts)
    • Vitor Farinha Luz (Characterization and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance)
    • Peter Schwardmann

    Summer Semester 2014

    • Marina Halac (Contests for Experimentation)
    • Johannes Hörner (Optimal Design for Social Learning)
    • Hector Chade (Coverage Denied: Excluding Bad Risks, Inefficiency, and Pooling in Insurance)
    • Tymofiy Mylovanov (Bayesian Persuasion with Heterogeneous Audience)
    • Mehmet Ekmekci (Manipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation)
    • Felix Kübler (Recursive equilibria in dynamic economies with stochastic production)
    • Jakub Steine (Perceiving Prospects Properly)
    • Alessandro Bonatti (Miscoordination and Delay in Strategic Experimentation)
    • Vasiliki Skreta (Selling under Product and Taste Heterogeneity)

    Winter Semester 2013/2014

    • Philippe Jehiel
    • Andriy Zapechelnyuk (Optimality of noncompetitive allocation rules)
    • Alp Atakan (Auctions, actions, and the failure of information aggregation)
    • John Quah (A test for weakly separable preferences)
    • Ilse Lindenlaub (Sorting Multidimensional Types)
    • V. Bhaskar
    • Joel Sobel
    • Botond Köszegi (Seller Information about Consumer Naiveté lowers welfare)

    Summer Semester 2013

    • Ilya Segal (Heuristic Auctions and U.S. Spectrum Reallocation)
    • Ian Jewitt (Adverse Selection with Multidimensional Heterogeneity of Types and Information)
    • Daniel Garrett (Competitive Screening and Search)
    • Jeanne Hagenbach (Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure)
    • Andrei Shleifer (Competition for Attention)
    • Huseyin Yildirim ((Un)Informed Charitable Giving)
    • Nicolas Vieille (Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games)
    • Ian Jewitt (Adverse Selection with Multidimensional Heterogeneity of Types and Information)
    • Kohei Kawamura (Biasing Contests for Selection)
    • Audrey Hu (English Auctions with Ensuing Risks and Heterogeneous Bidders)
    • Stefano dellaVigna (Voting to Tell Others)

    Job Market Talks

    • Mikhail Safronov (University of Cambridge)
    • Tobit Gamp (University College London)
    • Nina Bobkova (University Bonn)
    • Gleb Romanyuk (Harvard University)
    • Mirjam Salish (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
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