Past Seminars
A list of all past guest speakers in our Micro Theory Seminar
Winter Semester 2017/2018
- Marek Pycia (Invariance and Matching Market Outcomes)
- Olivier Gossner (An instrumental approach to the value of information)
- Shengwu Li (Credible Mechanism Design)
- Roberto Serrano (Level-k Mechanism Design)
- Sergei Severinov (Optimal and Efficient Mechanisms with Budget Constrained Buyers)
- Nicolas Klein (University of Montreal)
- Juuso Välimäki (All-Pay Auctions with Affiliates Values)
- Syed Nageeb Ali (A Theory of Self-Enforcing Coalitions)
- Vijay Krishna (Communication and Cooperation in Repeated Games)
- Wouter Hendrik Dessein (Organizations with Power-Hungry Agents)
- Ludmila Matyskova (Bayesian Persuasion With Costly Information Acquisition)
- Laura Doval (Sequential Information Design)
- Takuro Yamashita (Splitting problem applied to Bayesian persuasion and mechanism design with externalities)
Summer Semester 2017
- Wolfgang Pesendorfer (Random Evolving Lotteries and Intrinsic Preference for Information)
- Daniel Bird (Dynamic Nonmonetary Incentives)
- Jennifer Reinganum & Andrew Daughety (Information Suppression by Teams and Violations of the Brady Rule)
- Leeat Yariv (On the Efficiency of Stable Matchings in Large Markets)
- Rakesh Vohra (Stable Matchings and Scarf's Lemma)
- Jonas von Wangenheim (Buyer-Optimal Signals in Sequential Screening)
- Rahul Deb (Evaluating Strategic Forecasters)
- Maarten Janssen (Wholesale Price Discrimination and Recommended Retail Prices)
- Larry Samuelson (The Implementation Duality)
- Colin Stewart (Rational Inattention Dynamics)
- Mohammad Akbarpour (Thickness and Information in Dynamic Matching Markets)
- Roland Strausz (Mechanism Design with Partially Verifiable Information)
- Nicola Pavoni (Optimal Delegation, Unawareness, and Financial Intermediation)
- Tobit Gamp (Deceptive Products and Competition in Search Markets)
Winter Semester 2016/2017
Summer Semester 2016
- Peter Kondor (Learning in Crowded Markets)
- Moritz Mayer-ter-Vehn (A Human Resource Theory of Persistent Productivity Dispersion/ A Controversial War of Attribution)
- Tobit Gamp (Guided Search)
- Jidong Zhou (Competitive Bundling)
- Francesc Dilmé (Residual Deterrence)
- Daniel Quint (Indicative Bidding in Auctions with Costly Entry)
- David Levine (Voter Participation with Collusive Parties)
- Susanne Goldlücke (Assigning an unpleasant job without payment)
- Ran Spiegler (Can Agents with Causal Misperceptions be Systematically Fooled?)
- Chang-Koo Chi (Common Value All-pay Auctions)
- Antonio Cabrales (Targeted Socialization and Production)
- Olga Gorelkina (Estimate Based Dynamic Implementation)
- Matthew Elliot (Decentralized Bargaining: Efficiency and the Core/ Commitment and (In)Efficiency: A Bargaining Experiment)
- Albin Erlanson (Allocating divisible and indivisible resources according to conflicting claims: collectively rational solutions)
- Benny Moldovanu (Sophisticated Sincerity with Incomplete Information)
- Deniz Dizdar (Uncertainty and Investment Incentives in Finite Matching Contests)
- Vikram Manjunath (Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement)
- Nina Bobkova (Learning to Persuade)
- Marcus Matthias Opp (Only Time will Tell - A Theory of deferred compensation)
Winter Semester 2015/2016
- Jörgen Weibull (Evolution leads to Kantain morality)
- Darrell Duffie (Size Discovery)
- Christian Krestel (Optimal Stopping With Regret)
- Gilat Levy (Perceptions of Correlation, Communication, and Ambiguity)
- Felix Bierbrauer (Robust Mechanism Design and Social Preferences)
- Yeon-Koo Che (Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets)
- Larbi Alaoui (Cost-Benefit Analysis in Reasoning)
- Johannes Hörner (Motivational Ratings)
- Florian Scheuer (The Taxation of Superstars)
- Brett Green (On Breakthroughs, Deadlines, and the Nature of Progress: Contracting for Multistage Projects)
- Nick Netzer (Informational Requirements of Nudging)
- Ilan Kremer (Benefits of Minimum Standards in Voluntary Certification)
- Philipp Sadowski (Magical Thinking: A Representative Result)
- Philipp Külpmann (Procrastination and Projects)
- Matthias Messner (Selling to the mean)
- Benjamin Bachi (Buridanic Competition)
Summer Semester 2015
- Willemien Kets (A belief-based theory of homophily)
- Jan Eeckhout (Stochastic Sorting)
- Meg Meyer (Beyond Correlation: Measuring Interdependence Through Complementarities)
- George Mailath (The Curse of Long Horizons)
- Paul Heidhues (Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning)
- Hamid Sabourian (Repeated Implementation with Incomplete Information)
- Fuhito Kojima (Stability Concepts in Matching Under Distributional Constraints)
- Alex Wolitzky (Enforcing Cooperation: Community Enforcement vs. Specialized Enforcement)
- Simon Board (Competitive Information Disclosure and Consumer Search)
- Qinggong Wu (A Nonstationary Two-sided Matching Game)
- Claudia Herresthal (School Rankings, Student Allocations and School Choice Reforms)
- Ariel Rubinstein (Back to Fundamentals: Equilibrium in Abstract Economies)
- Debasis Mishra (Local Incentive Compatibility with Transfers)
- Jingfeng Lu (Optimal Contest Design with Incomplete Information)
- Philipp Kircher (Efficient Competition through Cheap Talk: The Case of Competing Auctions)
- Dan Barron (Policies in Relational Contracts)
- Philipp Strack (On the Speed of Social Learning)
Winter Semester 2014/2015
- Kristof Madarasz (Projection Equilibrium: Definition and Applications to Bargaining and Social Investment)
- Simon Loertscher (Multi-Unit Dominant Strategy DoubleAuctions)
- Rida Laraki (On the Existence of Approximate Equilibria and Sharing Rule Solutions in Discontinuous Games)
- Michael Mandler (Coarse, Efficient Decision-Making)
- Emre Ozdenoren (Rank Dependent Contracts)
- Christoph Kuzmics (Communication before coordination with independent private values: How pedestrians avoid bumping into each other)
- David Dillenberger (Cautious Expected Utility and the Certainty Effect)
- Juanjo Ganuza (Procurement and Accidents: Bidding for Judgment Proofness, and the Liability Curse)
- Julien Prat (Human Capital and Optimal Redistribution)
- Francis Bloch (Dynamic Allocation of Objects to Queuing Agents: The Discrete Model)
- Andrea Attar (Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets: Cross-Subsidies and Quantity Discounts)
- Vitor Farinha Luz (Characterization and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance)
- Peter Schwardmann
Summer Semester 2014
- Marina Halac (Contests for Experimentation)
- Johannes Hörner (Optimal Design for Social Learning)
- Hector Chade (Coverage Denied: Excluding Bad Risks, Inefficiency, and Pooling in Insurance)
- Tymofiy Mylovanov (Bayesian Persuasion with Heterogeneous Audience)
- Mehmet Ekmekci (Manipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation)
- Felix Kübler (Recursive equilibria in dynamic economies with stochastic production)
- Jakub Steine (Perceiving Prospects Properly)
- Alessandro Bonatti (Miscoordination and Delay in Strategic Experimentation)
- Vasiliki Skreta (Selling under Product and Taste Heterogeneity)
Winter Semester 2013/2014
- Philippe Jehiel
- Andriy Zapechelnyuk (Optimality of noncompetitive allocation rules)
- Alp Atakan (Auctions, actions, and the failure of information aggregation)
- John Quah (A test for weakly separable preferences)
- Ilse Lindenlaub (Sorting Multidimensional Types)
- V. Bhaskar
- Joel Sobel
- Botond Köszegi (Seller Information about Consumer Naiveté lowers welfare)
Summer Semester 2013
- Ilya Segal (Heuristic Auctions and U.S. Spectrum Reallocation)
- Ian Jewitt (Adverse Selection with Multidimensional Heterogeneity of Types and Information)
- Daniel Garrett (Competitive Screening and Search)
- Jeanne Hagenbach (Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure)
- Andrei Shleifer (Competition for Attention)
- Huseyin Yildirim ((Un)Informed Charitable Giving)
- Nicolas Vieille (Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games)
- Ian Jewitt (Adverse Selection with Multidimensional Heterogeneity of Types and Information)
- Kohei Kawamura (Biasing Contests for Selection)
- Audrey Hu (English Auctions with Ensuing Risks and Heterogeneous Bidders)
- Stefano dellaVigna (Voting to Tell Others)
Job Market Talks
- Mikhail Safronov (University of Cambridge)
- Tobit Gamp (University College London)
- Nina Bobkova (University Bonn)
- Gleb Romanyuk (Harvard University)
- Mirjam Salish (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
