Past Seminars

A list of all past guest speakers in our Micro Theory Seminar

Roland Strausz (A Theory of Crowdfunding - a mechanism design approach with demand uncertainty and moral hazard)

Tymofiy Mylovanov (Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver)

Santiago Oliveros (Competing for Loyalty: The Dynamics of Rallying Support)

Olivier Tercieux (The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence)

Philip J. Reny (Broad Sequential Equilibria of Multi-Stage Games with Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions)

Willemien Kets (Robust Multiplicity with a Grain of Naivete)

Gabriol Carroll (Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities)

Johannes Schneider (Managing a Conflict)

Andrew Rhodes (Multiproduct Intermediaries)

Maxwell Stinchcombe (Planning for the Long Run: Programming with Patient, Pareto Responsive Preferences)

Francesco Nava (Multi-Variety Durable-Goods Monopoly)

Ludovic Renou (Revealed Preferences over Risk and Uncertainty)

Frédéric Koessler (Selling with Evidence)

Guillaume R. Fréchette (Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma)

Peter Kondor (Learning in Crowded Markets)
Moritz Mayer-ter-Vehn (A Human Resource Theory of Persistent Productivity Dispersion/ A Controversial War of Attribution)
Tobit Gamp (Guided Search)
Jidong Zhou (Competitive Bundling)
Francesc Dilmé (Residual Deterrence)
Daniel Quint (Indicative Bidding in Auctions with Costly Entry)
David Levine (Voter Participation with Collusive Parties)
Susanne Goldlücke (Assigning an unpleasant job without payment)
Ran Spiegler (Can Agents with Causal Misperceptions be Systematically Fooled?)
Chang-Koo Chi (Common Value All-pay Auctions)
Antonio Cabrales (Targeted Socialization and Production)
Olga Gorelkina (Estimate Based Dynamic Implementation)
Matthew Elliot (Decentralized Bargaining: Efficiency and the Core/ Commitment and (In)Efficiency: A Bargaining Experiment)
Albin Erlanson (Allocating divisible and indivisible resources according to conflicting claims: collectively rational solutions)
Benny Moldovanu (Sophisticated Sincerity with Incomplete Information)
Deniz Dizdar (Uncertainty and Investment Incentives in Finite Matching Contests)
Vikram Manjunath (Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement)
Nina Bobkova (Learning to Persuade)
Marcus Matthias Opp (Only Time will Tell - A Theory of deferred compensation)

Jörgen Weibull (Evolution leads to Kantain morality)
Darrell Duffie (Size Discovery)
Christian Krestel (Optimal Stopping With Regret)
Gilat Levy (Perceptions of Correlation, Communication, and Ambiguity)
Felix Bierbrauer (Robust Mechanism Design and Social Preferences)
Yeon-Koo Che (Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets)
Larbi Alaoui (Cost-Benefit Analysis in Reasoning)
Johannes Hörner (Motivational Ratings)
Florian Scheuer (The Taxation of Superstars)
Brett Green (On Breakthroughs, Deadlines, and the Nature of Progress: Contracting for Multistage Projects)
Nick Netzer (Informational Requirements of Nudging)
Ilan Kremer (Benefits of Minimum Standards in Voluntary Certification)
Philipp Sadowski (Magical Thinking: A Representative Result)
Philipp Külpmann (Procrastination and Projects)
Matthias Messner (Selling to the mean)
Benjamin Bachi (Buridanic Competition)

Willemien Kets (A belief-based theory of homophily)
Jan Eeckhout (Stochastic Sorting)
Meg Meyer (Beyond Correlation: Measuring Interdependence Through Complementarities)
George Mailath (The Curse of Long Horizons)
Paul Heidhues (Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning)
Hamid Sabourian (Repeated Implementation with Incomplete Information)
Fuhito Kojima (Stability Concepts in Matching Under Distributional Constraints)
Alex Wolitzky (Enforcing Cooperation: Community Enforcement vs. Specialized Enforcement)
Simon Board (Competitive Information Disclosure and Consumer Search)
Qinggong Wu (A Nonstationary Two-sided Matching Game)
Claudia Herresthal (School Rankings, Student Allocations and School Choice Reforms)
Ariel Rubinstein (Back to Fundamentals: Equilibrium in Abstract Economies)
Debasis Mishra (Local Incentive Compatibility with Transfers)
Jingfeng Lu (Optimal Contest Design with Incomplete Information)
Philipp Kircher (Efficient Competition through Cheap Talk: The Case of Competing Auctions)
Dan Barron (Policies in Relational Contracts)
Philipp Strack (On the Speed of Social Learning)

Kristof Madarasz (Projection Equilibrium: Definition and Applications to Bargaining and Social Investment)
Simon Loertscher (Multi-Unit Dominant Strategy DoubleAuctions)
Rida Laraki (On the Existence of Approximate Equilibria and Sharing Rule Solutions in Discontinuous Games)
Michael Mandler (Coarse, Efficient Decision-Making)
Emre Ozdenoren (Rank Dependent Contracts)
Christoph Kuzmics (Communication before coordination with independent private values: How pedestrians avoid bumping into each other)
David Dillenberger (Cautious Expected Utility and the Certainty Effect)
Juanjo Ganuza (Procurement and Accidents: Bidding for Judgment Proofness, and the Liability Curse)
Julien Prat (Human Capital and Optimal Redistribution)
Francis Bloch (Dynamic Allocation of Objects to Queuing Agents: The Discrete Model)
Andrea Attar (Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets: Cross-Subsidies and Quantity Discounts)
Vitor Farinha Luz (Characterization and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance)
Peter Schwardmann

Marina Halac (Contests for Experimentation)
Johannes Hörner (Optimal Design for Social Learning)
Hector Chade (Coverage Denied: Excluding Bad Risks, Inefficiency, and Pooling in Insurance)
Tymofiy Mylovanov (Bayesian Persuasion with Heterogeneous Audience)
Mehmet Ekmekci (Manipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation)
Felix Kübler (Recursive equilibria in dynamic economies with stochastic production)
Jakub Steine (Perceiving Prospects Properly)
Alessandro Bonatti (Miscoordination and Delay in Strategic Experimentation)
Vasiliki Skreta (Selling under Product and Taste Heterogeneity)

Ilya Segal (Heuristic Auctions and U.S. Spectrum Reallocation)
Ian Jewitt (Adverse Selection with Multidimensional Heterogeneity of Types and Information)
Daniel Garrett (Competitive Screening and Search)
Jeanne Hagenbach (Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure)
Andrei Shleifer (Competition for Attention)
Huseyin Yildirim ((Un)Informed Charitable Giving)
Nicolas Vieille (Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games)
Ian Jewitt (Adverse Selection with Multidimensional Heterogeneity of Types and Information)
Kohei Kawamura (Biasing Contests for Selection)
Audrey Hu (English Auctions with Ensuing Risks and Heterogeneous Bidders)
Stefano dellaVigna (Voting to Tell Others)

Studentische Hilfskraft gesucht